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Abstract
Residential energy consumption is now an important component of total energy
consumption and its related emissions. In addition, this consumption has significant
potential for growth in both developed and developing countries, as average incomes
increase, and domestic appliance numbers rise. Reduction in this energy use may be
achieved both through conservation measures, and through increased efficiency in its
use. This paper focuses on energy efficiency in appliances – those many devices
through which household energy is consumed. The policy instruments available to
promote the uptake of more efficient devices, and issues associated with their use,
are reviewed, drawing on developed country experiences to date. The instruments
available are more limited than in other energy applications, and largely comprise
information dissemination, forms of subsidy, and regulation. The last is commonly
used in the form of Minimum Energy Performance Standards. Assessment of the
three instrument types and issues with their use suggests that regulation is the most
important measure – albeit with several qualifications on the manner of its use.
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1.

Introduction.

In global efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions much attention has properly been
given to large emission sources such as energy-intensive industry. Other sectors
however are of similar importance in emission terms. In particular, emissions from
residential energy consumption can be of the same order as those from industry [1].
Residential energy use is important both for its present size and potential growth,
and for the fact that it impacts directly on individuals in their daily lives. It is this
energy consumption, and the ways through which it may be reduced, which are the
focus of this paper.
The means of addressing residential energy emissions – the policy instruments - are
necessarily different to those important in other sectors. The objectives of this paper
are to identify the scale and composition of residential energy consumption, assess
the policy instruments available to address it and their relative effectiveness, and
suggest ways in which they may be best used. It uses as its basis developed country
experiences to date, given both the association of appliance use with income, and the
greater availability of appliance types in developed markets. Discussion is centred
around the role of appliances in domestic energy use. For convenience, the term
‘appliance’ is used here to describe all those numerous devices, large and small,
through which energy is consumed in the production of various services to
households.
Reduction in consumption by such equipment may be driven by both efficiency
improvements and conservation measures, the latter implying a lesser use of the
service in question. Besides implying different actions the two approaches differ in
the policy measures which are relevant. The focus here is on securing improvements
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in efficiency and the ways by which that may be achieved. The discussion considers
particularly the role of regulation (in the form of Minimum Energy Performance
Standards (MEPS)) as an active policy instrument.
2.

The Importance of Appliance Energy Use.

Addressing appliance energy consumption is important both because of its present
consumption and emissions, and also for its likely growth. Household energy
consumption (effectively representing appliance use in the most general sense)
represents a significant portion of total energy consumption in developed countries.
Importantly, as the major energy carrier is electricity with its associated emissions,
households are a major greenhouse gas (GHG) source. Domestic consumption’s
share of national electricity consumption is of the same order as, and in some cases
higher than, that of industry [2] – the more common target for greenhouse emission
reduction initiatives. Residential energy end-use emissions (that is, the total
emissions arising from the use of domestic appliances) in the EU27 countries in
2009 comprised 25% of total emissions – virtually the same as industry at 26% [1].
Table 1 shows electricity consumption data for a range of OECD countries of
different economic ‘size’ and income, the EU27, and a world average.

The table shows the significant share of total electricity consumption going to
domestic use, and the varying ratio between residential and industrial electricity use.
It shows also the markedly varying electricity use per capita, and GDP per capita as a
proxy for average income levels. The latter is notable for the evident disparity
between average world income, and that of the OECD countries shown. That has
important connotations for the potential growth of domestic energy consumption, as
discussed below.

3 Revised submission version 010812 single 050203

Table 1: Residential electricity consumption and income

Residential use as
% total
Residential as %
of industry
Residential use,
MWh/capita/yr
GDP/cap (2009)

Aust

Canada

NZ

UK

US

EU27

World

23

26

28

29

31

24

27

61

85

87

104

151

71

66

2.77

4.84

2.98

1.93

4.54

1.64

2.48

$39,900 $38,100 $27,300 $34,200 $46,000 $31,900 $11,100

Source: [2], [3].

The scale of residential consumption implies that it must be addressed as a part of
any effective overall energy/emissions policy. Appliance ownership is increasing in
higher-income countries [4], particularly in consumer electronics and computingrelated equipment. In addition, given the association of appliance ownership with
income, GDP per capita increases in most developing countries will lead to further
major growth in appliance utilisation – a point well highlighted by the difference
between the OECD country incomes shown above, and world average income. The
scale of that potential growth is evident from examples such as China (of similar
population to the OECD [3]) – whose electricity consumption per capita is currently
less than 30% of the OECD average [5]. The US Energy Information Administration
predicts that by 2015 non-OECD country residential energy use will exceed that of
OECD countries [66]. Failure to deploy effective policy instruments will lead to
significant emission increases from these sources.

In terms of the contribution of the various appliance types, it is difficult to develop
detailed comparative data because of differences in the categories and definitions
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used by countries reporting data. Illustrative data for five countries and the EU-27
are given below in Table 2.

Figure 1: Components of residential electricity use (% of total) in selected countries

Data for

Australia

Canada

NZ

UK

US

EU27

Year/source

2006-7 / [6]

2004 / [7]

2005 / [8]

2005 / [ 9]

2008 / [10]

2007 / [11]

Several issues are evident from Figure 1. First, the data depict substantial
differences in category energy consumption between the countries listed. These
differences are a product of
-

variation in national energy supply mix (e.g. New Zealand, unusually for a
developed country, derives 38% of domestic heating from woody biomass
[12])

-

differences in national per capita energy consumption, and electrical energy
consumption, as noted in Table 1

-

real differences in the relative use of individual appliance classes and, not
least

-

likely definitional and methodological differences in category data reporting.
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The differences in results between countries is worthy of study in its own right but is
not developed further here, being noted primarily to indicate the range of potential
consumption associated with the major appliance classes.

Second, it is apparent that appliances fall into two groups – those few ‘thermal’
appliances of high power consumption (space heating and cooling, water heating and
possibly refrigerator/freezers), and a larger number of appliances of individually
smaller consumption. The latter are numerous and increasing (in Australia for
example from 52 per residence in 2000 to 67 in 2005 [4]), and the two groups quite
different in nature. Appliance purchasing decisions are likely to be made on
different bases for the two groups, and this has implications for the policy
instruments with which to address them, as discussed below.

An increasingly important category of consumption not separately noted above but
which is embedded in many devices is that of ‘standby’ consumption, the electricity
consumption due to appliances in their idle state – that is, when they are not
delivering the service for which they were designed. The consumption level is
typically low, but highly variable both between and within appliance types.
Measured average standby power data for European devices showed CRT monitors,
for example, to have nearly three times the standby power of LCD monitors. As
importantly, the ratio between the average standby power and that from the best
available technology (BAT) was around 5:1 for LCD monitors, and 10:1 for CRT
monitors. While standby levels are relatively low (around 3W and 6W for the two
monitor types), the total number of devices concerned is high and hence total
consumption is also high. The IEA compared standby power consumption survey
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data between Japan and Australia in 2005. Australia (which, as Table 1 shows, is not
at the upper end of the household electricity consumption range) with an average of
67 appliances per house, recorded average standby consumption of 807 kWh per
year, or 10.7% of total household consumption. Japan, with fewer appliances per
house (28) recorded standby consumption of 308kWh per year, or some 7.3% of
total household consumption [4]. In the US, with over 40 appliances per household,
it was suggested that standby power could actually account for the majority of
electricity consumed by some devices such as set-top boxes, audio equipment and
video equipment [67].
Within the overall set of appliances is one set of devices which well represent the
difficulties of dealing with high-number, small consumption devices. These are the
ubiquitous external power supply packs for devices of all types from mobile phones
to laptop computers. In the 2009 US Residential Energy Consumption Survey, for
example, nearly a third of households had at least four devices such as mobile
phones plugged in and charging at home [66]. There are believed to be some 5.5
billion of these devices in use in the world, consuming some 50 TWh per year, or
around 1 – 1.5% of total residential electricity [4]. They are clearly a significant
source of energy use which must be addressed, but – as with standby power - by
means different to those of larger appliances.
In summary, residential electricity use is significant in terms of national total
consumption, and is highly dispersed – both over millions of individual households
and within those, over a range of appliance types with significantly differing
consumption levels. It is not surprising therefore that addressing such consumption
in policy terms has its own particular difficulties. Before considering that however it
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is useful to look briefly at the broad range of policy instruments available for related
purposes, using the wider field of overall GHG emission reduction as an illustration.

3.

Policy Instruments

Policy instruments are the tools that governments use to implement their policy
objectives. Available policy instruments vary widely in nature, and selection of the
most appropriate instrument is a key factor in the achievement of those objectives –
an aspect as true in the climate policy area as any other. This is demonstrated by a
broad literature in climate policy addressing instrument selection in diverse
circumstances - for example in the promotion of wind power [13], supporting waste
wood utilisation [14], and the selection of instruments to suit market segments [15],
among many others. The diversity of applications makes climate change and energy
policy a fruitful field for such study. This paper contributes to that by considering
the very specific use of energy in domestic consumption, and the policy instruments
most suited to reducing that consumption and its resultant emissions.
In the broader field of energy/emission reduction there exists a wide range of
instruments by which government may pursue their policy targets. That however is
not the case here. For a number of reasons discussed below, the range of policy
instruments which may be put to use in this area is notably more limited than
elsewhere, and that in turn has implications for how the available instruments should
be used. The objective here is to assess the policy instruments associated with
addressing such emission sources, their likely effectiveness, and what specific issues
need to be addressed to ensure that effectiveness. The following discussion briefly
examines the range of policy instruments available and in use in the broad field of
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emission reduction. The instruments from that set which are relevant to appliance
energy are then identified, together with the factors influencing their effectiveness in
that application
4.

Policy Instruments for Climate Change

The International Energy Agency [16], in its broad ‘Policies and Measures’ overview
of member countries, identified instruments in use for emission reduction as
generally falling into five types – three ‘policy families’, and two specific tools:
1. policy processes (strategic planning, disseminating information, and
consultation)
2. fiscal instruments (incentives – tax/subsidy measures))
3. regulatory instruments
4. voluntary agreements

and

5. tradeable permit systems.
Here, ‘policy processes’ are treated as being represented by information programs, as
the active form of intervention in that group. In addition to the basic instrument
types, some practical instruments may combine elements to form hybrid instruments.
Examples of individual instrument types, and certain issues with their use, are briefly
reviewed below.

4.1

Information Programs

These initiatives seek to address one possible cause of market failure – a lack of
information on the part of market participants, which prevents them from taking
what should be rational economic decisions (‘rational’ being used here in the specific
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economic sense of the “reasoned pursuit of self interest” [17]). For example,
producers may be unaware of potentially profitable means of reducing their energy
consumption, or consumers unaware of the costs in operation of motor vehicles with
differing fuel efficiency. Providing information may enable both to identify means
by which they may reduce energy consumption, and gain economically. The UK
Carbon Trust for example, like many such national agencies, works with industry
through their Industrial Energy Efficiency Accelerator program, included in which is
the provision of ‘best practice’ case studies in various industries [18]. At the
individual consumer level, the Australian Government has since 2002 required new
vehicle labeling showing fuel consumption and greenhouse emission rates, to
facilitate car buyers making informed choices in their vehicle purchase [19]. For
appliances, labeling is the most common information approach.
Issues impacting on the effectiveness of information measures include the actual
magnitude of the energy consumption being addressed, the nature of consumer
response, and the ‘principal-agent problem’.

4.1.1 Energy consumption: as noted above, appliances may be broadly divided into
a few large energy consumers, and numerous smaller devices. With the former, the
lifecycle energy operating cost may well be such as to allow an economic case to be
made for energy efficient devices, providing that prospective purchasers may be so
persuaded. Even where that is not the case, energy may well be a sufficient part of
lifecycle cost that it is included in overall appliance assessment. That is not so with
all appliances. Even amongst the larger of these, energy costs are not high. The
author’s own relatively recent washing machine and refrigerator for example would,
under the specified operating cycles, consume around $A70 and $A98 per year in
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electricity costs respectively, using Australian Government label data and January
2011 NSW electricity prices [20]. A 10% difference in those costs (as might for
example arise through comparison between alternative brands) would therefore lead
to cost impacts of around sixteen and nineteen cents per week, an amount most
unlikely to materially affect consumer behaviour. In marketers’ terms, the amount is
unlikely to exceed the “just noticeable difference” between alternatives, and hence
unlikely to influence consumer response [21].

As a purchasing decision determinant, energy consumption is even less significant
when considered in the context of other performance parameters. Particularly in the
computer and consumer electronics sector, the purchase decision is more likely to be
driven by aspects such as screen size and resolution, processor speed, or any of the
myriad performance variables through which suppliers seek to differentiate their
products. That suggests that the value to be gained from labelling systems may be
very limited if the information being presented is not among the principal selection
criteria.

4.1.2

Consumer response: appliance labeling is premised on the assumption that

making adequate information available to consumers should result in rational
decisions in favour of more efficient appliances, where appropriate. This is however
difficult to objectively establish. In its 2005 review of energy efficiency programs,
the Australian Productivity Commission concluded “Appliance energy-performance
labels have some influence on consumers after they have short-listed products on the
basis of characteristics such as price, performance, capacity and style” [22]
(emphasis added). Tversky [23] described a very similar process in his ‘elimination

11Revised submission version 010812 single 050203

by aspects’ (EBA) model, an approach which might be used by consumers as an
heuristic aid to simplifying decision-making in a situation of product selection. As
noted in 4.1.1, such a process could well eliminate energy efficiency as a factor in
selection unless it were considered to be a primary selection variable.

In another observation, in the UK in 2006 following a detailed survey (including
interviews with over one thousand consumers) Oxera (consulting for DEFRA)
concluded “The most important finding is that future energy savings do not appear to
be an important factor in a householder’s decision...to buy efficient appliances.....If
the energy savings are considered as part of the decision at all, they feature only
weakly” [24]. Were that to be the case generally, the value of labelling as a policy
instrument in its own right would appear limited. Considered in association with
Section 4.1.1 above, it might be expected that this problem would be greatest among
the smaller appliances, where even a clear knowledge of device energy would be
unlikely to sway appliance selection founded on other more salient characteristics.

4.1.3

The ‘principal-agent’ problem: discussion thus far implicitly assumed that

both benefits and costs of any appliance purchase will flow to the purchaser.
Particularly in the case of the larger ‘thermal’ appliances that is not always so.
Appliances such as hot water systems for example may be bought by owners of
rental accommodation, or by property developers completing dwellings for sale. In
such cases while the purchaser will bear any additional cost incurred through the
selection of higher efficiency appliances, they will not experience the subsequent
benefits of reduced energy consumption. This may lead to the broader economic
‘principal-agent’ problem, a situation where one entity (the ‘agent’) acts on behalf of
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another (the ‘principal’) but acts in a manner contrary to the principal’s interests
[25]. It is often difficult for the future value of such savings to be embedded in
either dwelling purchase cost, or rental. Even where a premium to take such savings
into account has been incorporated in rental, for example, it has been shown that
tenants may act in a manner as to increase their energy consumption by an amount
greater than the premium [26].

4.2

Incentives

Fiscal incentives may be positive or negative, in either making preferred goods and
services cheaper, or others more expensive where a reduction in their consumption is
sought. A widely used positive incentive has been that used to subsidise renewable
electricity development in various countries. It is exemplified by the German Feedin Tariff (FIT), a measure requiring the purchase of renewable energy by distributors
at specified (and hence to generators, guaranteed) prices [27]. A negative incentive
may be seen in the UK fiscal measure which re-fashioned the annual road tax for
cars in that country to make it dependent on the level of vehicle emissions [28].

Negative incentives in the form of taxes on domestic electricity may impact on the
larger appliances, but, as outlined above, are unlikely to affect smaller appliances.
Taxes specifically targeted at domestic energy are also likely to be problematic
politically. Positive incentives through subsidies are hence more common, but may
suffer from a ‘free rider’ problem. This occurs where incentives are paid to those
who would have bought efficient appliances in any case, thus increasing the cost to
government of the incentive system [24]. In one notable study in Norway,
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assessment of incentives for participation in an energy conservation program
indicated that around 70% of those taking up the incentive would have undertaken
the investment within two years in any case, without the incentive [29]. While
careful policy design may seek to minimise the impact of free riders, it may in
practice be very difficult to identify ex ante the likely takeup of an energy efficiency
measure in the absence of a subsidy incentive.

4.3

Regulation

Pure regulation has not been common in emission reduction measures. Where it has
been used it has been both positively and negatively directed. Negative regulation
for example may be seen in the mandatory phasing out of incandescent light bulbs by
the EU and Australia from 2008 forward [30], [31]. Positive regulation may be
typified by Australia’s mandatory Renewable Energy Target (RET), requiring the
purchase by electricity retailers of a certain quantity of renewable energy [32].
Regulation may also be deployed as the setting of standards of performance, an
increasingly important policy tool discussed further below.

4.4

Voluntary Agreements

Voluntary agreements (VAs) for emission reductions have seen wide use. Japan’s
emission reduction measures for example are heavily reliant on the VA undertaken
between the government and industry sectors through Keidanren, the Japanese
industry organisation [33]. Single sector VAs have also been used, as for example
with steel plants in China, and industry sectors in The Netherlands [34]. While VAs
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offer fewer difficulties in their introduction than do more coercive measures,
questions have been raised as to their real effectiveness. From a survey of actual
national programs the OECD [35] concluded, in regard to VAs generally, that “the
effectiveness of voluntary approaches is still questionable”. VAs are arguably the
second least coercive of the instruments available to government, (information
provision being the least) although noted as often existing “under a shadow of
regulation” [36].

Voluntary agreements are however not widely used in the appliance efficiency field.
The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) database on policies and measures shows
only several examples, impacting on issues such as incandescent light bulb phaseout
in France, and standby power consumption reduction in Japan [37]. Both these are
issues addressed by regulation elsewhere. Voluntary agreements may play a role in
the development of performance standards under regulation – but here it is regulation
which is the operational instrument and provides the principal driver for efficiency
improvement.

4.5

Tradeable Permit/Emissions Trading Systems.

Market based emissions trading systems (ETS) function to facilitate the reduction of
emissions at lowest cost, and operate at various jurisdictional levels. The Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative among ten US states for example is a cap-and-trade
system which undertook its first permit auction in 2008 [38]. Nationally, New
Zealand proclaimed its domestic ETS in 2008 with the major energy sectors being
included from 2010 [39]. At the supranational level the European ETS has been the
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‘flagship’ trading scheme since its inception in 2005 [40]. All such systems function
on the basis of mandating a cap on emissions (a regulatory step), with participants in
the market having the alternatives of buying emission credits to cover their excess
emissions, reducing their emissions below their assigned limits and selling the
resultant credits, or simply trading.

A related form of tradeable permit/certificate system has relevance to certain
appliances whose greenhouse gas emission reductions may be adequate to justify a
permit system. For example the Australian Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme
is designed to induce the purchase of solar or air-source hot water systems through a
tradeable certificate (Certified Emission Reduction) system. In most cases in that
scheme however the associated certificates are routinely taken into account by the
equipment supplier [32], thereby appearing to the purchaser simply as a discount or
purchase subsidy. That reflects the fact that as the amount of energy saving which
individuals might be able to trade is generally only modest, transaction costs for
individual participation in such trading schemes are virtually prohibitive.

4.5.1 Emissions Trading Systems and a Carbon Price.

A consequence of implementing a broadly based emissions trading system across an
economy is that a price is implicitly attached to any unit of carbon which contributes
to GHG emissions, with that price flowing through the economy to services such as
electricity. The ETS thereby generates an incentive across the economy to reduce
the consumption of energy services. In principle, and with appropriate design, such
a system should render unnecessary any other policy instrument for this purpose. As
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the Australian Government’s review of its Climate Change programs (the ‘Wilkins
Review’) put it “[i]f there were a broad-based perfectly functioning emissions
trading scheme in Australia, there would be no need for any complementary
policies.” [41]. That review however recognised the need for a range of
complementary measures, and focused on means of ensuring that policies were truly
complementary.
The International Energy Agency reached a similar view. Taking as its starting point
that energy efficiency should be at the core of the policy response to GHG
emissions, it concluded that “..while carbon pricing is a prerequisite for least-cost
carbon mitigation strategies, carbon pricing is not enough to overcome all the
barriers to cost effective energy efficiency actions.” [42]. Those barriers included
imperfect information, principal-agent problems, and behavioural failures, the latter
being largely through the presence of bounded rationality (‘rationality’ in the
definitional sense noted in Sect 4.1). Gillingham et al [43] noted also the possibility
of decision-making influences from prospect theory (where consumers value
asymmetrically gains or losses of similar magnitude, potentially leading to
conservatism in decisions) and the use of heuristics (various strategies adopted to
simplify the cognitive task of decision making, even if at the cost of utility
maximisation). Tversky’s EBA model [23] noted in section 4.1.2 would be an
example of such an heuristic.
The discussion which follows proceeds on the basis that a simple ETS alone can not
adequately address the available avenues for energy efficiency improvement in the
appliance field and considers the instruments which might be used for that purpose.
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5

Appliance Instruments in Use.

Of the five instruments considered above two (voluntary agreements, and permit
trading systems) are not considered of major value at the individual consumer level
where purchase decisions on efficient appliances are made. The sections following
consider the remaining three types (information provision, regulation and incentives)
with several examples of each. For a wider range of example programs, and more
detailed information, the IEA database Energy Efficiency – Policies and Measures
[37] provides a valuable overview of international programs and instrument use.

5.1 Information Systems (Labeling).

Labeling systems are used for three distinct purposes – to indicate compliance with a
set minimum performance standard, to provide comparative performance data with
the objective of encouraging purchasers to favour more energy efficient models, or
to indicate a product of superior performance. One of the best known of the first
type is the “CE mark” – an EU standard symbol indicating that the appliance has
complied with relevant EU standards and hence may be placed on the market and
move freely within the EU [44]. Such systems focus on compliance rather than
relative performance, and hence are essentially adjuncts of minimum performance
standard systems.

The second type of label seeks to address market failure arising through ‘bounded
rationality’, as noted in Section 4.1, which suggests that “[h]umans...must make
inferences about unknown features of their world under constraints of limited time,
knowledge, and computational capacities” [45]. Decisions are influenced by limited
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information, the purchaser’s own capabilities and, as Goto et al [46] put it, the “cost
of thinking”. Label programs seeking to enhance a potential purchaser’s knowledge
rely on an assumption of rationality – that presented with all relevant information, an
individual will make choices which maximise personal benefit.

Such labels may as a minimum seek to address an information deficiency concerning
a product’s characteristics, or go further and provide some partly processed
information (for example, the annual cost of operation) to simplify the purchaser’s
decision-making task. The Australian Energy Rating Label is an example of the
former type, quoting for most appliances the electricity consumed per year in typical
use [47]. The US EnergyGuide label is of the latter type, presenting the cost per year
for typical use cycles and a standard electricity cost, in addition to basic electricity
consumption [48].

The third type of label seeks to impart some ‘premium’ value to an appliance by
recognising superior performance. The German ‘Blue Angel’ environmental
labeling system awarded in 2009 its first energy efficiency-based labels for products
such as netbooks and electric kettles. The Blue Angel, founded in 1978, sees itself
as “an ecological beacon showing the consumer the way to the ecologically superior
product” [49]. The US ‘Energy Star’ label system has a similar objective. It
commenced in 1992 and coverage now extends beyond appliances, to new homes
and commercial buildings, and the broad provision of advice and assistance on
energy saving [50]. Similar systems operate in other countries, all sharing a
common feature of identifying appliances of superior energy performance – and
hence also targeting the ‘bounded rationality’ issue.
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Labeling systems providing information still leave the purchasing decision with the
consumer. Another approach however limits consumer choice by precluding lowefficiency products – through the application of Minimum Energy Performance
Standards (MEPS).

5.2 Regulation: Minimum Energy Performance Standards

The concept of MEPS is essentially simple – to legally enforce performance
standards on either an individual appliance or class basis. In practice however, as
with other policy instruments, it is the specific implementation details which
determine the real impact of the measure. Minimum performance standards vary in
their application in a number of ways through
-

the intended effect of the standard

-

the manner in which the standard is determined

-

the method of measuring compliance and

-

the time frame allowed for compliance.

The objective of MEPS systems is to reduce overall energy consumption in the
delivery of the desired service from the appliance concerned. If it is assumed that in
most situations prior to the application of MEPS appliance efficiencies will vary over
a range, then a reduction in overall consumption may be done in various ways by
-

simply removing from sale the least efficient devices

-

seeking to improve the efficiency throughout the range generally or
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-

pursuing the development of more efficient devices, with a specific focus on
fostering development of new products of higher efficiency than those
currently in the market.

Each objective implies setting standards at different levels, and indeed may be
applied consecutively. For example initial standards may be set so as to exclude
from sale the least efficient current appliances, with subsequent standard
development seeking to raise class efficiency over the range. In the first instance no
product development is required to achieve an improved average efficiency; in the
latter product development and innovation is required.

Performance standards may also be determined based on broader practical and policy
considerations. Examples from the EU, US, and Japan illustrate the range of
approaches adopted. Arguably the most explicit measure in setting out its objective
is the EU Directive 2009/125/EC [44], governing the minimum standards which
individual appliances must meet to be eligible for sale in the EU. Annex II of the
directive specifies that “the level of energy efficiency or consumption must be set
aiming at the life cycle cost minimum to end-users for representative product
models, taking into account the consequences on other environmental aspects”, in a
process using realistic product lifetimes, and discount rates from the European
Central Bank. Technical options for improvement must be identified through
technical, environmental and economic analysis, taking account of economic
viability and any significant performance loss. The analysis must include also an
assessment of the best performing products and technology, and both product
performance and benchmarks from other national systems.
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The US approach to standard setting is similar, while addressing a broader range of
factors. In an iterative process stakeholder views are sought, analysis (market,
engineering and cost-benefit) undertaken, further consultation sought on preliminary
results, and analyses repeated where necessary. Factors statutorily required to be
taken into account include, for any proposed standard, economic impacts, energy
savings, any performance reduction, competition effects, and any other factors
deemed relevant. In addition, the standard setting process must result in levels
which achieve the maximum improvement in energy efficiency which is technically
possible and economically justified [51].

Taking a different approach, the ‘Top Runner’ system adopted in Japan focuses more
on demonstrated existing performance, with the identified ‘Top Runner’ products
effectively setting a future benchmark for others. In principle, the Top Runner
concept implies that “energy conservation standards for electric appliances, etc. shall
be set exactly the same as or higher than the best standard value of each product item
currently available in the market” [52]. Thus as appliance designs evolve, the Top
Runner approach provides an implicit driver to continually raise the level of
performance in the product class overall. In practice, while best current performance
forms the basis of evaluation, allowance is also made for expected technological
development, in extensive consultation with manufacturers and other stakeholders
[53]. Published target years give manufacturers clarity as to required compliance.
When measured, compliance is measured by manufacturer’s product class weighted
average, against the set Top Runner standard [54]. Mechanisms (largely ‘name and
shame’ approaches) exist to impose sanctions on manufacturers who do not meet
specified requirements [53].
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A standard feature of the determination of MEPS levels has been the assessment of
economic impacts. Examples may be seen from the US [68], the EU [69] and
Australia [70] – all regulatory impact assessment statements or their functional
equivalents. Such measures help to ensure that the use of regulation does not impose
negative impacts in its pursuit of environmental effectiveness – a necessary factor if
the potential disadvantage of regulation in the form of MEPS is to be avoided.

5.3 Incentives - fiscal and subsidy instruments

Labeling systems seek to encourage consumer decisions in favour of energy efficient
purchases by capitalising either on consumers’ economic rationality (in showing the
economic benefit to consumers of energy efficiency) or consumers’ preparedness to
contribute to the common good (by demonstrating the environmental advantage of
their purchase). Minimum energy performance requirements on the other hand
essentially preempt consumer preference, by limiting consumer choice to products of
a certain minimum performance level. The third major approach relies on modifying
the price set within which consumers make decisions, to make more attractive the
purchase of the higher energy efficiency products. These incentives may be
generated in a variety of ways including direct payments to purchasers, and tax
credits or rebates.

A variety of mechanisms of differing detail may be used to deliver an incentive to
purchase. Comparisons between these are not discussed here, as the objective is to
consider differences between broad classes of policy instruments. The use of
subsidies to pursue energy efficiency however has been relatively widespread. The
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World Energy Council, considering 78 countries, separately lists incentives provided
for appliances, lamps and water heating. Table 3 shows the number of countries in
which incentives have been provided [55].

Table 3: Number of Countries Offering Incentives in Different Classes

Appliances

Lamps

Water Heaters

Subsidy

11

15

22

Tax benefits

4

5

5

Data from [55]

While significant, the number of countries using incentives is still much lower than
those employing minimum performance standards for major appliances. The same
WEC database for example shows 63 countries using MEPS for refrigerators, 56 for
washing machines, and 40 for air conditioners [55].

In addition to those listed, other measures have been put in place as a result of the
2007 global economic crisis. Governments deployed energy efficiency funding as
part of explicit stimulus measures in Italy for example [37] and in the US through
funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [56]. These
will not be further considered here, as the reasons for their deployment are only
secondarily those of energy efficiency. However they do serve to demonstrate
recognition that such expenditures may be closely targeted, and relatively effective
and rapid in their response.

24Revised submission version 010812 single 050203

6

Ranking Policy Instruments for Appliance Energy

The practical set of policy instruments available and in use to address the significant
energy use (and hence emissions) associated with appliances comprises
-

information provision

-

incentives in the form of subsidies of various types and

-

regulation in the form of product performance requirements (MEPS).

Various criteria have been used to evaluate and rank the different types of
instruments. One such set suggested by the OECD [57] includes
•

environmental effectiveness

•

economic efficiency

•

impact on competitiveness

•

feasibility of implementation

•

stimulation of long-term technological innovation and

•

any “softer” measures of success, such as increased awareness or engagement
generated by use of the instrument.

Of these factors, those most relevant to the instruments and objective considered
here are environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, and, related to that,
stimulation of innovation. Other factors listed, while important, are much less likely
to provide major points of difference between the three instrument types discussed.

Environmental effectiveness: information programs help promote energy efficiency
but as discussed in Section 4.1 their effectiveness in influencing purchase decisions
is questionable. Subsidies are more likely to induce the uptake of efficient
appliances, although their effect is less predictable than that of regulation. MEPS,
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enacted in law, would be expected to be the instrument most capable of producing
high and predictable increases in appliance efficiency - subject to adequate
compliance monitoring.

Economic efficiency – achieving the desired outcome at the lowest possible cost – is
determined by both cost and goal achievement. Information programs, while low in
total cost, are also lower than subsidies and regulation in their achievement of
environmental effectiveness. They are likely overall to be less economically
efficient than the alternatives, for an equivalent level of effectiveness. Of those
alternatives, subsidy programs can be handicapped by the presence of free riders.
Subsidies to free-riders do not induce action - hence their cost reduces the economic
efficiency of the overall measure. In addition, subsidy provision appears most
prevalent in devices of high energy usage such as water heaters [55] – applications
where the greatest likelihood exists for a positive economic case even without
subsidies. The cost of regulation may be relatively low for government, but may be
significant for firms’ compliance – and hence for consumers, firms being assumed
here to be able to pass on their costs to those consumers. Compliance cost is
strongly affected by the efficiency level demanded, and the extent to which that
raises appliance prices. That in turn is influenced by whether redesign and
innovation may be used to achieve lower product cost, a centrally important issue. It
is innovation and resulting technological change which may be harnessed to pursue
higher energy efficiency, at constant or possibly lower product cost.

Pickman [58], citing US manufacturing data, noted that innovation was an industry
response to environmental regulation, albeit it might entail substitution from other
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alternative innovation avenues. From a broad survey of the empirical literature on
environmental policy and technological change Vollebergh [59] similarly concluded
that environmental policy initiatives had an impact on at least the direction of
technological change, regardless of the type of instrument used. He noted that
particularly in the process emissions field, standards served to provide clear signals
as to what attributes of processes were undesirable (and by inference, what were
desirable). As he put it “[s]tandard-driven technological change is directed by the
physical signal given by the standard”. In terms of appliances, energy efficiency as
such is not a normal design criterion for manufacturers [60], in the absence of
Vollebergh’s ‘signal’. Where that signal is given (and that is most clearly through
the definition of performance standards) innovation may work to offset the costs
potentially arising from that increased efficiency.

The phenomenon of appliance prices dropping after performance-improving
regulation was introduced has been noted in a number of cases. Greening et al [61]
assessed the case of refrigerator/freezer price movements in the US after
performance standards were introduced in 1990 and 1993. They concluded that the
higher efficiency of new models did not lead to an increase in ‘quality-adjusted’
prices, which had indeed continued to decrease in line with historical trends. Dale et
al [65] identified similar results over a range of products, attributing the
improvements in price to factors including product innovation, reduced markups, and
economies of scale in the production of higher-efficiency units. In the UK,
introduction of performance standards (again of refrigerator/freezers) in 1999
occurred at the same time as a significant drop in product prices, attributed in part to
increased competition among wholesalers [60]. Using an experience curve approach
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on three ‘wet’ appliances, Weiss et al [62] identified “a robust long-term decline in
both specific price and specific energy consumption of large appliances”. Clearly
price movements resulting from mandated efficiency increases will depend on the
circumstances of individual cases. As a minimum, however, it can be said that
higher prices do not automatically follow from higher efficiency performance; and
more, that innovation, among other factors, offers the potential for real cost
reduction.

A notable area in which a performance standard has been promoted as a policy
instrument internationally is that of standby power, discussed in Section 2. The
International Energy Agency has coordinated an approach premised on a target of
one watt standby power for all devices, and a number of countries have commenced
regulatory steps in that regard [63]. Standby power is an area of significant potential
and one for which the approach of performance standards is well suited and indeed
the likely most practical solution.

6.1

Preferred alternatives.

The preceding discussion suggests there is a valid and justifiable role for regulation
(through Minimum Energy Performance Standards) in increasing the efficiency of
appliances, and reducing emissions caused by their use. There are arguments
however against regulation – some ideological, and others practical. Stavins [64] for
example pointed out that regulation in the form of standards may not provide the
incentive for ongoing improvement that is found in, for example, taxes. That
suggests that regulation should not be used where alternatives of similar efficacy are
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available, and also that where used, care should be taken to minimise any
disadvantage of regulation.

In Section 2 above it was noted that the appliance family fell reasonably naturally
into two components – one group, few in number and of significant individual
energy consumption, and the other a much larger group with individually smaller
consumption levels. The former group offers the possibility of some economic
rationale in the choice of energy efficient appliances; the latter group in most cases
does not. This division forms a logical basis to determine the use of regulation, with
the latter being the appropriate group for which regulation (performance standards)
should be the principal instrument to drive change. In the former group, the
existence of some economic benefit should be used as the basis to promote change –
suggesting a role for labeling and information dissemination, with incentives only
being used where there is inadequate economic incentive without subsidy.

At the same time however, where regulatory assessment measures indicate no
consumer disadvantage, it is reasonable that MEPS be used to ensure minimum
performance for the environmental gains which that ensures, while retaining
consumer choice among the complying appliances. As noted in Section 5.3 above,
that approach has been adopted with larger appliances in many countries to date.

As a second issue, it is argued here also that where regulation is used, it should be
regulation of a dynamic nature to provide the ongoing incentive for improvement
claimed for tax-based instruments. The nearest such measure in current practice is
the Japanese Top Runner approach [52], premised on two major bases – the adoption
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of current best performance as the criterion for the future, and a visible and
predictable process of standard raising over time. In addition, its use of a class
average approach to compliance allows the retention of lower efficiency appliances,
providing their performance is compensated by other products. That in turn
minimises disadvantage to those consumers for whom higher efficiency devices
cannot be justified – for example, those intended for extremely intermittent use.

The role of labeling and information provision clearly differs between the two
groups noted above. Where there is material economic benefit to consumers in large
appliances of higher efficiency, the role of labeling should be to identify such
advantage and promote it to consumers. As a second role, ‘premium’ labeling
systems such as the Blue Angel system should continue to identify superior products
to promote their use. For those appliances of lower energy consumption, the role of
labeling is primarily to confirm compliance with standards – although there is value
in labeling systems demonstrating the benefits of standards, to promote public
support for such systems. That in turn may make the political task of standard
setting more broadly feasible.

A final issue in terms of choice between the three policy instruments considered here
lies in the potential for regulatory measures to address matters not able to be
addressed by other means – as for example where more than one aspect of
performance needs be addressed. This is illustrated by the case of standby power
consumption, that potentially substantial energy use which goes on when the
appliance concerned is not delivering its service. The problem which arises in
addressing this consumption is that there is not necessarily a correlation between
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overall appliance efficiency, and the level of standby power. Hence performancebased labels which are based on one variable only may give entirely the wrong signal
to consumers in terms of another variable. Regulation however, providing it is
consistent, can separately address the two variables in parallel – a useful feature
when more than one appliance characteristic is of importance.

7

Conclusions.

The analysis above reveals three main issues most relevant to appliance efficiency
arising from the application of the three instruments information provision,
incentives and regulation:
-

the nature of the two groups into which appliances generally fall, and the
effect of that on instrument suitability

-

the multiple roles played by two of the instruments and

-

the relative importance of the instruments as drivers for change, and any
conditions on their use

The two groups of appliances included a set of only three larger appliances of
significant energy consumption – space heating and cooling systems, water heating
systems, and perhaps refrigerator/freezers, and a numerically far larger set of devices
each of far lower unit energy consumption than the first set. Because of both their
higher energy consumption, and also their higher cost, those of the first set are more
likely to receive in-depth assessment in their purchase – with that assessment likely
to include the magnitude of energy use as a variable. For that reason, the first set of
appliances offers a greater possibility for higher energy efficiency to be a positive
influence in the purchase decision. In turn that suggests that information provision
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through labeling and other means may be of value, and also that subsidies carefully
designed to produce the minimum necessary economic case for purchase may be
effective. Because of the gains to be made from improving the energy consumption
of this group, performance standards are also commonly used, because of their
effectiveness, to exclude low-efficiency appliances.

The second group of appliances appears likely to be little affected by subsidies
(given a low energy component of total cost), and also to be little affected directly by
labeling programs, in the presence of competing performance parameters influencing
consumer choice. Achieving efficiency improvement in this group must largely rely
on regulation in the form of performance standards to address the supply side, rather
than the demand side of the market. Where performance standards for the first set
simply define a base level, those for the second set effectively are the principal
motivators for improvement.
Regulation in this manner plays a different role with the two groups of appliances –
defining a minimum acceptable performance in one, and in the other likely to be the
principal determinant of outcomes. A second instrument - information provision also has multiple functions. In the case of the first set of appliances, the role of
information provision is to the extent possible to influence consumers’ actions by
informing them of potential gains. While there is an element of persuasion in
influencing attitudes, it is the informational role which is most relevant. With the
second set of appliances, the role of information provision is to identify the
necessary compliance with defined standards – but also to aid acceptance of those

32Revised submission version 010812 single 050203

standards by identifying the gains to be made through efficiency improvement. It is
regulation in this case which provides the necessary driver for improvement.
That in turn suggests that with appliances overall, regulation in the form of minimum
performance standards has a perhaps surprisingly high influence – in the
determination of performance in the smaller appliance group, and in setting a
baseline for larger appliances. It has been argued here that to effectively utilise
regulation in both these functions, the regulation process itself should be dynamic,
employing progressive enhancement of standards of the type demonstrated by, for
example, the Japanese Top Runner system. That process would involve continuing
and transparent standards development based on demonstrated performance, and be
applied on a class compliance basis to preserve maximum choice for consumers, in
the context of overall increases in appliance class efficiency. Undertaken in this
manner, regulation of appliance performance has a significant role to play in the
reduction of domestic energy consumption.
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